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Summary: This is the third in a series of three papers that examines the laws, 
regulations, and voluntary industry practices that may aid consumers who contest 
an electronic transaction because of error, fraud, or merchant dispute. The first 
two papers describe the complex web of protections available to users of four 
popular electronic payment mechanisms: credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards, 
and ACH e-checks. This third paper considers how protections related to fraud, 
error, and disputes affect market participants. The paper concludes that (i) the 
current protection mechanisms make it more difficult to encourage the adoption 
of fraud-reduction schemes, (ii) the current protections represent a significant 
cost to banks, merchants, processors, and consumers, and (iii) the present federal 
system of protection, while encouraging innovation and thoughtful regulation, 
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In 2003, consumers used electronic forms of payment to execute almost 45 billion 
transactions involving $2.5 trillion in goods and services.
1  While the overwhelming majority of 
these transactions were cleared and settled without incident, some were contested by consumers 
as being fraudulent or erroneous or became the subject of a dispute with a merchant. This is the 
third in a series of papers that examines the laws, regulations, and voluntary industry practices 
that may aid consumers who contest an electronic transaction for one of these reasons. The first 
two papers, which can be accessed on the Center’s website,
2 describe in detail the complicated 
web of protection available to users of four popular electronic payment mechanisms: credit cards, 
debit cards, prepaid cards, and ACH e-checks. (For a high-level, tabular summary of the 
consumer protections available on these mechanisms, see Appendix A.) These products are used 
to conduct over 90 percent of all electronic consumer payment transactions.
3  
This third paper considers how the protections associated with the four payment products 
profiled affect market participants. This analysis yields three conclusions: First, the current 
protection mechanisms make it more difficult to encourage the adoption of fraud-reduction 
schemes. Second, the current protections represent a significant cost to banks, merchants, 
processors, and consumers. Finally, the federal portion of the current system, while promoting 
innovation and well-thought-out regulation, leads to consumer confusion. 
 
II. How Mandatory and Voluntary Consumer Protections Affect Payment System 
Participants  
 
As described in the two earlier papers, consumers of most electronic payment products 
are protected from fraud, error, and dispute by relatively strong federal laws, network rules, and 
                                                 
1 The Nilson Report, No. 823, Dec. 2004, p. 6. 
2 These other papers are available at www.philadelphiafed.org/pcc/papers. 
3 NACHA and The Nilson Report (No. 823) report that consumers conducted 45 billion electronic 
transactions in 2003, divided among the various forms of electronic payment as follows: credit cards (21 
billion), debit cards (16 billion), prepaid cards (2 billion), ACH e-checks (1 billion), and other ACH (2 
billion). (Due to rounding, numbers do not add to 45 billion.) 
  1internal bank policies. As a result, consumers of the most popular electronic payment products 
face virtually no liability for erroneous transactions and very limited liability for fraudulent 
transactions. In addition, they have access to a dispute-resolution process that often favors 
consumer interests. Shielding consumers from most forms of liability and furnishing them with an 
array of complex federal rights and voluntary protections, however, is costly and difficult. Such 
protections require that parties with diverse interests, such as card issuers, merchants, merchant 
banks, and payment networks, settle a variety of thorny issues, including how the costs of these 
protections should be allocated, how the information systems that will handle consumers’ claims 
should be designed, and how to settle disputes that may arise among industry participants. 
The following examines how the protections provided to consumers and the complex 
infrastructure designed to support these protections influence the behavior of consumers who 
engage in these types of payment transactions. This analysis focuses on the credit and debit card 
systems, since these payment vehicles handle the vast majority of consumer electronic payments. 
Information in this section comes, in part, from interviews the author conducted with merchants, 
issuers, and processors while researching the first two papers. 
A. Making It More Difficult to Adopt Fraud-Reducing Technologies 
  Arguably, the most valuable consumer protection described in this series of papers 
pertains to fraudulent transactions. Because of Regulations E and Z, the associations’ zero 
liability policies, and issuers’ own practices, consumers of credit and debit cards are shielded 
from nearly $3 billion in fraud losses each year.
4 Internal rules developed by the associations 
allocate this expense among merchants, merchant banks, card issuers, and the associations 
themselves. This section examines these rules, the incentives that underlie the associations’ fraud 
allocation systems, and the effects of these rules and incentives on the behaviors of the various 
parties to a credit or debit card transaction. My analysis proposes “ideals” for structuring a fraud 
                                                 
4 See Appendix C for details and sources related to this estimate of fraud loss. 
  2allocation system, examines the current system, and measures the current system against the 
ideals. 
1. The ideal system 
  If one could design an ideal system of allocating fraud liability among various parties to a 
fraudulent card transaction, what kinds of behaviors would the system seek to encourage? First, 
and perhaps most important, the system would encourage the widespread use of payment cards by 
consumers. In general, consumers are risk adverse and will disproportionately underuse a 
payment product they believe is risky. For this reason, an ideal fraud allocation system would 
convince consumers that any checking account balances or lines of credit associated with a 
payment card are safe and easily replaceable in the event of theft. Without trust in the system’s 
ability to indemnify victims of random acts of fraud or theft, consumers would be hesitant to use 
it.   
  Second, the rules of allocating liability in the ideal system would encourage parties to the 
transaction to exercise due care. System participants, such as consumers, issuers, and merchants, 
would work to minimize fraudulent activities over which they have some measure of control. 
Consumers, for example, would take special care to safeguard their cards and monitor their 
accounts for suspicious activity; issuers would create secure cards and card processing systems 
that would be difficult to compromise; and merchants would properly use card processing 
systems and take measures to verify that the cards presented to them actually belong to those 
doing the presenting. In short, each party would take some simple and relatively cost effective 
steps that, together, would reduce the system’s exposure to most types of fraud. 
  Finally, in an ideal environment, payment system participants would adopt any fraud-
reduction strategy that saved the entire system more money than it cost, even if the benefits of 
  3such a strategy accrued disproportionately to the parties involved.
5 Consider, for example, a 
hypothetical fraud strategy that could halve the total fraud occurring in the system at a cost equal 
to 10 percent of total fraud. In an ideal payment system, the strategy would be adopted, even if no 
single participant experienced enough savings to entirely pay for the strategy’s implementation on 
its own.
6  
2. The current system 
  I now examine the current fraud allocation system and its incentives. For the purpose of 
this analysis, four parties are considered: consumers, traditional brick-and-mortar merchants, 
Internet and catalogue merchants, and card issuers. The payment card networks that make the 
rules with respect to fraud allocation are also critical entities. But since the major networks in the 
U.S., i.e., MasterCard, Visa, American Express, and Discover, are controlled by those who issue 
cards,
7 I will assume that issuer interests and network interests are aligned.
8 Another important 
entity in a card payment transaction is the merchant’s bank. In general, however, any fraud 
expense incurred by a merchant bank on behalf of a merchant is immediately passed along to the 
merchant. Appendix B includes a diagram of a typical card transaction, including the parties 
discussed above. 
                                                 
5 As used here, the term “cost” includes more than just fraud losses and the expense of anti-fraud 
technologies and systems. It also includes the time it takes users of a proposed fraud-reduction scheme to 
meet its requirements and the cost of any legitimate sales lost because of fraud screening. 
6 The type of efficiency described here, in which an improvement to a system will be made as long as its 
benefits outweigh its costs, is typically referred to as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. It is different from so-called 
Pareto efficiency in which a change to the system is made only if it makes some better off and no one 
worse off. 
7 In August 2005, MasterCard announced that it will overhaul its corporate governance and ownership 
structure. As part of this overhaul, it plans to become a publicly traded company and shift control of the 
entity from its existing bank shareholders to investors. It is unclear how this change will affect the 
relationship between MasterCard and the banks that have traditionally controlled it. See MasterCard press 
release, “MasterCard Announces Plans for New Governance and Ownership,” Aug. 31, 2005, available at 
www.mastercardinternational.com/cgi-bin/newsroom.cgi?id=1081&category=all. 
8 In the case of American Express and Discover, the issuing bank and network are operated by the same 
company. As a result, network and issuer interests in their cases are perfectly aligned.  
  4  At present, the parties to a credit or debit card transaction incur approximately $3 billion 
in fraud losses each year.
9 Given the “zero liability” policy of the associations and the strong 
protections afforded consumers under Regulations Z and E, however, few of the losses associated 
with fraud are borne by consumers. Specifically, consumers are likely to bear responsibility for 
fraudulent charges in just two rare cases: when an issuer can prove that a debit card customer 
purposefully delayed reporting a lost or stolen card and when a debit card customer does not 
discover fraud because he did not review his statements for more than two months. While there 
may be consumers who experience losses for these two reasons (and there may be some issuers 
that do not waive the $50 of federal liability), consumers generally have negligent exposure to 
card fraud losses. A chart detailing the losses consumers and others experience because of fraud 
by card product type is presented in Appendix C. 
  Like consumers, traditional brick-and-mortar merchants also face very little liability for 
fraudulent transactions. Under the rules of the bank card associations (and those of the PIN debit 
networks), brick-and-mortar merchants that properly authorize a “card present” transaction have 
little or no liability if that transaction turns out to be fraudulent. Publicly available excerpts from 
MasterCard’s 2004 Chargeback Guide
10 explain that merchants accepting cards must generally 
do the following to avoid liability for fraudulent transactions: determine if the card is valid by 
examining its expiration date, signature, and other security features; obtain authorization for the 
card’s use; provide consumers with a detailed receipt; obtain the cardholder’s signature; and 
compare the signature obtained to the one on the back of the card. While brick-and-mortar 
merchants interviewed for this paper explained that they did experience fraud losses for card 
present transactions (because, for example, employees failed to follow proper point-of-sale 
procedures), the incidence and cost of this fraud are relatively low. 
                                                 
9 The $3 billion includes the cost associated with goods and services stolen by thieves as a result of fraud. It 
does not include a myriad of indirect fraud costs, such as the cost of fraud-reducing technologies and bank 
employees that monitor fraud. 
10 Available at www.mastercardmerchant.com/docs/accept_mastercard/merchant_rules.pdf. 
  5  Internet and catalogue merchants, unlike their brick-and-mortar counterparts, bear 
significant liability for fraudulent transactions. This is the case because, under the rules of the 
bank card associations, liability for fraud shifts from card issuers to merchants when a transaction 
is effected without an actual piece of plastic. Presumably, this shift occurs because, without 
access to the physical card, traditional security features (e.g., magnetic stripe, signature panel, or 
hologram) cannot be used for authentication. Last year, Internet and catalogue merchants paid 
nearly $2 billion back to card issuing banks and their customers to cover card-not-present fraud.
11 
This represented 1.8 percent (180 basis points) of all online transaction volume.
12 In an effort to 
reduce their losses, Internet and catalogue merchants have individually invested in a variety of 
fraud-reducing tools. These tools, which include address verification services, internally built 
fraud screens, geo-locators, customer history searches, and card verification code checks, can be 
expensive for merchants to purchase and implement and lead to the rejection of some legitimate 
consumer orders.
13
  Despite being able to charge back card-not-present fraud losses to Internet and catalogue 
merchants, card issuers are required under association rules to absorb most of the losses 
associated with traditional brick-and-mortar merchant fraud. Last year, card issuers paid for 
approximately $1 billion of the system’s fraud losses, mostly as a result of cards being lost, 
stolen, or counterfeited. As a percentage of the volume that flows through the associations’ 
networks, this represented approximately 0.05 percent (5 basis points)—a record low.
14 Over the 
past decade card issuers have made great strides in reducing the types of fraud for which they are 
                                                 
11 Estimate based on a 2005 CyberSource Online Fraud Report (available upon request from CyberSource). 
It includes both fraud chargebacks to merchants from issuers and credits issued by merchants to consumers 
because of fraud. While some in the card industry doubt that Internet merchants absorb this much fraud, it 
is clear that these retailers bear more of the burden of fraud than any other parties discussed here. 
12 2005 CyberSource Online Fraud Report.  
13 The 2005 CyberSource Online Fraud Report finds the following with respect to Internet merchants: 
spending on fraud management tools is equivalent to 0.40 percent of total online revenues; direct fraud 
losses are equivalent to 1.8 percent of total online revenues; and over 5 percent of all Internet sales are 
rejected because of a suspicion of fraud. 
14 See The Nilson Report, March 2005 (#830) and May 2005 (#833). 
  6liable by improving card activation procedures, monitoring card transactions, and adding more 
sophisticated security features to the card. 
3. The ideal system vs. the current system 
  As described earlier, an ideal system of fraud allocation would accomplish three goals: It 
would encourage consumer usage of card products, provide parties with incentives to exercise 
due care, and adopt any fraud-reduction schemes that provide a net benefit to the system as a 
whole. I argue that the current fraud allocation scheme accomplishes the first of these three goals 
and falls short with respect to the last two. 
By fully insulating most consumers from the liability associated with fraudulent 
transactions, the current system promotes consumer confidence and, as a result, encourages the 
widespread use of cards. Evidence of this can be seen in consumers’ aggressive adoption of card-
based payment products. Credit cards, for example, have become nearly ubiquitous, with three-
quarters of U.S. families owning at least one card.
15 Debit cards have also become exceptionally 
popular. From 1998 to 2003, for example, the percentage of households that owned a debit card 
increased from 37 percent to 54 percent.
16 In total, credit and debit card purchases now account 
for almost half of all noncash payments.
17 Overall, the consumer-friendly fraud allocation system 
adopted by the payment networks approaches the hypothetical ideal in that it has contributed to 
the widespread adoption of credit and debit cards by consumers.  
While the current system achieves nearly ideal levels of consumer adoption, it does so at 
the expense of another ideal—that of encouraging parties to exercise care. This is the case 
because the system resolves two competing interests—encouraging consumers to use the payment 
networks and requiring that they bear the costs of their behaviors—in favor of the consumer. For 
example, even a consumer who writes his personal identification number (PIN) on the front of his 
                                                 
15 Thomas A. Durkin, “Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
September 2000, p.625. 
16 Christoslav E. Anguelov et al., “U.S. Consumers and Electronic Banking, 1995-2003,” Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Winter 2004, p.6. 
17 Federal Reserve System, “Federal Reserve Payments Study, 2003,” December 2004, p.4. 
  7card with permanent pen is not responsible for subsequent PIN-debit losses as long as he reports 
the theft of his card or discovers the fraud within relatively generous time frames.
18 These pro-
consumer fraud policies make it difficult for card issuers and merchants to encourage consumers 
to take the relatively simple steps within their control to reduce the system’s exposure to fraud. 
Another example of this is the difficulty Visa is experiencing in enrolling consumers in Verified 
by Visa (VbV), an Internet payment authentication scheme. While Visa has significantly 
increased the number of merchants that accept VbV through price incentives, it has not yet 
enrolled even 1 percent of its U.S. consumer card base.
19 Given consumers’ incentives (i.e., zero 
liability for Internet fraud losses), one would not expect consumers to adopt VbV without a 
change to the current system.
The incentives built into the current system also fail to encourage brick-and-mortar 
merchants to exercise reasonable care in order to avoid fraud. In theory, merchants must go 
through a variety of steps (e.g., examining card security features, verifying signatures) when 
accepting a credit or debit card in order to avoid any liability for fraud. In practice, however, 
merchants are challenged to be as exacting as the rules require and often do not attempt to verify 
signatures or ask for identification when the signature panel is illegible. Fraud losses that result 
because of a failure to verify a signature are typically covered by issuers because it is difficult for 
issuers to prove that a merchant did not follow the proper procedures.
20 Because brick-and-mortar 
merchants are generally not responsible for this fraud, they have little incentive to carefully 
examine signatures and ask for identification when necessary. In an ideal system, however, 
merchants would be encouraged to use the simple tools available to them, i.e., the ability to 
simultaneously observe the card and the signing of the receipt, to avoid losses. 
                                                 
18 See Official Staff Commentary to Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)-2 (2005). 
19 John Stewart, “Behind the Buzz in Authentication,” Digital Transactions, Jan./Feb. 2005, p. 34. 
20 This is the case because a card used to perpetrate fraud is rarely recovered, and, as a result, it is often 
impossible to verify that the signature on the back of the card differs from the signature on a receipt. In 
many cases, a thief or counterfeiter will actually sign or re-sign the back of the card with his own hand, 
rendering verification by the merchant ineffective.  
  8The current fraud allocation system is also less than ideal in that it has not encouraged the 
adoption of more efficient tools to fight Internet fraud. Ideally, a fraud allocation system would 
encourage merchants, issuers, and consumers to adopt any fraud management strategy that would 
represent a net benefit to the system. Because the present fraud allocation rules place all liability 
for Internet fraud on Internet merchants, however, there is little incentive for consumers or issuers 
to adopt systemwide tools that prevent Internet-based fraud. As a result, the thousands of 
merchants that do business on the Internet have had to independently shop for and deploy 
relatively small-scale solutions to combat fraud. One would assume that a common solution for 
all Internet merchants would be less expensive and provide a level of fraud protection that is more 
effective. (To the extent necessary, merchants could then supplement this common solution with 
additional fraud-fighting strategies.) But because incentives are misaligned, even if card issuers 
could, for example, build a fraud-fighting machine at a one-time cost of $1 billion that would 
permanently reduce Internet fraud by 80 percent, they have little reason to do so. Such a system 
would be of little benefit to issuers and costly. Ideally, however, Internet merchants could 
compensate issuers for this expense and the common solution would be adopted. 
  It is clear that the current rules for allocating fraud liability among the various parties to a 
card transaction have contributed to a very high level of consumer adoption of credit and debit 
cards. It is also clear that, because of strong economic incentives, issuers have done an excellent 
job combating the brick-and-mortar-merchant fraud for which issuers themselves are liable. The 
incentive structure has so far failed, however, to encourage system participants to adopt fraud 
prevention tools for Internet purchases that are as effective or efficient as those used in the brick-
and-mortar environment. 
B. Increasing the Costs of Consumer Goods and Services 
  In addition to influencing the adoption of fraud reduction schemes, the systems of 
protection described in the two earlier papers in this series significantly increase the cost of 
electronic payments. As described in the first two papers, depending on card type and issuer, a 
  9payment card transaction may be protected by a variety of federal laws and voluntary policies. All 
market participants may not appreciate, however, the expense of these protections and how these 
protections likely increase the cost of the goods and services that are consumed. 
In general, the expense associated with providing fraud, error, and dispute protection has 
two components: a direct cost component and a processing cost component. In the context of a 
fraudulent transaction, the direct cost component is the value of the good or service that is stolen 
by the perpetrator of the fraud. As described in the previous section, direct fraud losses from debit 
and credit card use totals approximately $3 billion per year. In the case of dispute, the direct cost 
is the value of any goods or services for which the consumer will not be liable (but for which the 
issuer or merchant will take responsibility). It is difficult to estimate the extent of such direct 
losses, as issuers may voluntarily accept them or merchants may go on to recover some of these 
direct losses from the consumer (either by having the consumer return the merchandise or 
initiating collection proceedings).
21 Information regarding the outcome of merchants’ recovery 
and collections efforts is not available. In the case of error, there typically is no direct loss 
because the consumer reporting it has paid more for the goods and services then they should 
have.
22  
The second component is the cost of processing a fraudulent, erroneous, or disputed 
transaction. When a consumer discovers a fraudulent transaction or wants to initiate a dispute, she 
notifies her card’s issuer. Depending on the circumstances, the issuer may either initiate a “receipt 
retrieval request” (to get more information about the charge) or reverse, i.e., “charge back,” the 
transaction to the merchant that originated it. In the first instance, the merchant must send a copy 
of the signed transaction receipt to the issuer. In the second instance, the issuer refuses to pay for 
                                                 
21 While a consumer who convinces his card’s issuer to charge back a disputed transaction is no longer 
responsible for the charge to the issuer, he may still be responsible for the charge to the merchant. As such, 
the merchant may pursue the consumer under state sales law for the value of any goods or services from 
which the consumer benefited. See Official Staff Commentary to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(c)-2 
(2005). 
22 Errors that merchants and issuers make in favor of consumers are not likely to result in consumer harm 
and, as a result, are not addressed by consumer protection policies. 
  10the transaction and “charges it back” to the merchant. The merchant, in turn, may refuse to accept 
the chargeback (a decision usually supported by some kind of evidence). The issuer may once 
again attempt to charge the transaction back, and, if the merchant again refuses to accept the 
chargeback, the merchant and issuer submit their claim to arbitration.  
Processing retrieval requests and chargebacks that are prompted by consumers’ calls is 
resource intensive and represents a significant cost to the industry. Large issuers, for example, 
build computer systems and staff entire departments that specialize in handling consumers’ calls 
regarding fraudulent and disputed transactions. The merchant processors on the receiving side of 
such requests similarly invest in personnel and system resources to handle issuers’ inquiries. 
Beyond systems and staffing costs, issuers and merchants face fees when they use the 
associations’ networks for chargebacks. Issuers who initiate a chargeback, for example, must pay 
a fee to the association that ranges from $10 to $25, and a similar fee is assessed to the merchant 
to whom the transaction is returned. If the chargeback is disputed and goes to arbitration, a fee of 
over $400 is typically assessed to the losing party. To retrieve a receipt, merchants often pay a fee 
to their merchant processor of up to $8.
23  
Because of a lack of data, it is difficult to estimate the total cost of protecting consumers 
from fraud, error, and dispute. As mentioned earlier, issuers and merchants incur approximately 
$3 billion in direct credit and debit card fraud losses each year. Credit card issuers spend 
approximately $1 billion to $2 billion to process disputed, erroneous, and fraudulent charges.
24 
Estimates as to how much debit card issuers and merchants (or merchant processors) spend on 
processing problem transactions are not available. There are also no estimates for how much 
merchants lose to chargebacks resulting from error or dispute. Based only on the portion of 
expenses for which there are estimates (i.e., credit and debit card fraud losses and credit card 
dispute processing costs), the system spends at least $12 to $18 per active card per year to protect 
                                                 
23 Mark Betz, “Chargebacks and Consumer Behavior,” Transaction World Magazine, Oct. 2001, p.9. 
24 See Betz. 
  11consumers.
25 As a percentage of volume that moves through the system, these known costs 
represent 25 to 30 basis points. 
The $4 billion to $5 billion in total known expenses that result from the extension of 
fraud, error, and dispute protections are not paid for by any single party to credit or debit card 
transactions. Instead, the costs of these protections are ultimately passed along to consumers in 
the form of higher interest rates or fees on payment products or higher prices for retailers’ goods 
and services.  
One could argue that competition led to the creation of the bulk of these relatively 
expensive protections, since the extent to which consumers are protected by the bankcard 
associations often exceeds federal requirements. It is clear, however, that federal law significantly 
influenced the shape of the current protection system. Consider, for example, the most significant 
disparity between signature debit cards and PIN debit cards—the ability of a consumer to dispute 
a charge and request that his or her issuer charge it back to the merchant. The roots of this 
protection are likely in the bankcard associations’ responses to federal law applicable to credit 
cards. Under the Truth in Lending Act, credit card issuers are required to provide a certain level 
of dispute protection to their customers. Because of this, the bankcard associations built networks 
that could handle disputes and any related chargebacks. Many years after the networks were built, 
signature debit cards became popular and the bankcard associations were able to extend dispute 
protection to debit cards without incurring the high fixed costs associated with modifying their 
networks. The traditional PIN-debit networks (i.e., those that trace their beginnings to bank 
ATMs) have not made the significant investments necessary to provide consumers with dispute 
protection, in part because federal law does not require it and because the high fixed costs of such 
a project likely outweigh its perceived benefits. Overall, it is clear that the federal government’s 
                                                 
25 Assumes that there are approximately 328 million active credit and debit cards. The Nilson Report, No. 
828, Feb. 2005, p.7. 
  12efforts to protect consumers affect consumers’ expectations and the products beyond those the 
government sets out to regulate. 
The fraud, error, and dispute protections extended to consumers of credit and debit cards 
generate expenses for the payment system that are high, relatively diffuse, and largely attributable 
to federal regulation. It is not clear, however, whether the beneficiaries of these protections, i.e., 
consumers, fully appreciate these expenses and how they increase the costs of goods and services. 
It is also not clear whether policymakers, who mandated protections on credit cards and not debit 
cards, appreciate how their policies have shaped the broad payment card market. Without such an 
appreciation, payment system participants cannot accurately evaluate the utility of various 
consumer protection policies.  
C. Leading to Consumer Confusion 
 In the U.S., where new payment products are constantly competing for space in 
consumers’ wallets, one can envision at least two ways of implementing federal consumer 
protections (assuming that such protection is needed). The first is by promulgating rules and 
regulations that address specific problems associated with a specific payment vehicle after 
observing how consumers use that vehicle. The second is by promulgating rules and regulations 
that are generic and applicable to all forms of electronic payments, including emerging payment 
forms that are being introduced to consumers for the first time. Both of these approaches have 
advantages and disadvantages that policymakers must consider. 
The advantages of the wait-and-see approach are many: First, it allows payment 
innovators to introduce products that may not otherwise be viable if immediately subjected to 
costly regulation. In the period preceding regulation, innovators can test how consumers respond 
to different protection regimes and modify their product and its protections based on these 
responses. Second, this approach gives policymakers a chance to observe how a new product has 
been used and marketed before the writing of regulations. This permits policymakers to tailor 
protections to the actual problems that users of the new payment form are most likely to 
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associated with different protection regimes, improving the likelihood of policymakers choosing a 
scheme in line with consumers’ needs.  
The wait-and-see approach, however, is not without disadvantages. During the wait-and-
see period, early adopters of a new payment form may be essentially unprotected, vulnerable to 
problems such as fraud, error, and dispute. Also during this period, issuers are uncertain as to how 
their product is going to be regulated. This uncertainty creates incentives for innovators to spend 
less money developing new payment forms and to spend more time trying to influence how 
regulators write consumer protection rules. Finally, the wait-and-see approach leads to 
inconsistent regulation. The rules that apply to each payment product differ based on how most 
consumers use the product and how the product is marketed—attributes that are probably not 
apparent to most consumers. 
The key advantage of the one-rule-for-all approach is its simplicity for all parties 
involved in a transaction. Under this approach, issuers understand that any product introduced 
must carry a minimal level of protection; there is no uncertainty surrounding how the product will 
be regulated in the future. Consumers understand that, regardless of how a payment product is 
marketed, how long it has been around, or how other consumers primarily use it, it is protected in 
the same way as the other products they use. And merchants understand that, when they accept a 
new form of payment, the range of problems for which consumers will have recourse are 
generally predictable. 
The simplicity of the one-rule-for-all approach comes at a cost. Under this approach, 
regulators must formulate a rule that sufficiently protects the users of multiple payment products 
that target different markets and have different uses. Neither consumer expectations nor voluntary 
industry efforts are considered. Under these constraints, regulators are likely to adopt a protection 
scheme that overprotects the users of some products and underprotects users of others. This 
approach also places regulators in the difficult position of crafting rules that apply to payment 
  14forms that have not yet been conceived by the market. Finally, this approach likely discourages 
innovation, particularly with respect to low-cost products. The cost of federal protections may 
prevent entrepreneurs from introducing products that consumers demand (and for which 
consumers are willing to forgo protection), depriving consumers of low-cost payment options. 
Which approach to consumer electronic payment regulation have U.S. policymakers 
favored? Consider the following regulatory developments: Credit cards were first subject to 
federal consumer protection regulation after 18 years on the market and after nearly 10 percent of 
U.S. households owned one.
26 Debit cards were explicitly covered by federal consumer 
protection regulations in 1984, nine years after their introduction
27 and at a time when regulators 
estimated that there were over 6 million debit cards in use.
28 Electronic benefits transfer (EBT) 
cards were covered by consumer protection regulations in 1994, two years after federal legislation 
encouraged states to deploy EBT and at a time when many states had already started operating 
EBT programs.
29 The regulations applied to EBT were similar to those that applied to debit cards 
with the exceptions of modifications made in response to the product’s unique attributes.
30 At 
present, regulators are considering providing customized consumer protections for payroll 
cards.
31 This consideration comes at a time when nearly 2.2 million U.S. workers are paid via 
payroll card
32 and nine years after regulators considered such regulations for the first time.
33
                                                 
26 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic (MIT Press, 2
nd ed., 2005), pp. 53-61. 
27 See Evans, p. 81. 
28 “The Board believes it is important that the coverage issue be resolved at this time because the number of 
debit cards being used in POS transactions is increasing…By the end of 1983, the number of debit cards 
was expected to exceed 6 million.” 49 Fed. Reg. 2204 (1984). 
29 See 59 Fed. Reg. 10,678 (1994). 
30 See 59 Fed. Reg. 
31 In September 2004, the Board published for comment a proposal to amend Regulation E so that it covers 
payroll cards. See 69 Fed. Reg. 55,996 (2004). 
32 Ann All, (Apr. 7, 2004) “The Channel Shuffle,” ATMmarketplace.com, available at 
www.atmmarketplace.com/futurearticles.htm?article_id=18820&pavilion=112&step=storywww.ATMmark
etplace.com (accessed Sept. 29, 2005). 
33 In May 1996, the Board proposed a rule that would have exempted many stored-value products from 
Regulation E and subjected other products to limited regulatory requirements. See 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696 
(1996). 
  15It seems clear that U.S. policymakers favor the wait-and-see approach. They wait until a 
product is somewhat popular before regulating, and they regulate in a way that takes account of 
the payment form’s unique characteristics. As compared to the one-rule-for-all approach, the 
current model likely produces regulations that are more responsive to consumers, less intrusive to 
industry, and more fostering of innovation. Unfortunately, however, it also causes greater 
confusion, particularly among consumers who use multiple payment products. 
Responses to the wait-and-see policy have been mixed. The few legal scholars who have 
examined this issue advocate more uniformity among the payment laws that apply to credit cards, 
debit cards, and other electronic forms of payment.
34 In the context of general government 
regulation, economists argue that the wait-and-see approach is better because it permits market 
forces to influence the regulatory outcome. As seen in this series of papers, issuers have 
responded to the wait-and-see approach by attempting to impose uniformity through the use of 
voluntary protections. The additional layer of protection issuers provide, however, comes with its 
own list of exceptions, exclusions, and reporting rules that may add to consumer confusion. 
The present system of federal consumer protection values customized and responsive 
regulation over consistency, predictability, and ease of understanding. While this may be a wise 
choice, there are likely ways of making the present federal system less opaque for consumers. 
Overall, policymakers would be wise to consider reforms to our federal consumer protection 




                                                 
34 See, e.g., Mark Budnitz, “Consumer Payment Products and Systems: The Need for Uniformity and the 
Risk of Political Defeat,” Annual Review of Banking & Financial Law 24 (2005) pp. 247-293 (arguing for 
the enactment of “a uniform federal law to impose minimum standards for payment products and systems 
to ensure essential rights for consumers”); Ronald J. Mann, “Making Sense of Payments Policy in the 
Information Age,” Georgetown Law Journal 93 (2005), p. 633 (arguing that “credit and debit cards should 
have similar limitations on finality”). 
  16III. Conclusion 
  Without a doubt, the protection systems described in the first two papers in this series are 
of tremendous benefit to all of those involved in the payment system. They encourage the 
adoption of electronic payment products, function as a type of insurance that spreads the risk of 
unforeseeable losses, induce consumers to make purchases from merchants whom consumers 
may not otherwise trust, and encourage payment system innovation. Overall, fraud, error, and 
dispute protections give consumers confidence in the electronic payment systems on which they 
often must rely.  
These protections and the systems that support them, however, are not without costs. The 
present system used to allocate responsibility for fraudulent transactions results in (1) consumers 
and brick-and-mortar merchants not having sufficient incentives to exercise a reasonable level of 
care during card transactions and (2) Internet merchants inefficiently addressing the problem of 
Internet fraud on an ad hoc and individual basis. In addition, the direct cost of covering fraud, 
error, and dispute losses, combined with the cost associated with processing and adjudicating 
consumers’ claims, has a material effect on the prices of the payment products and goods and 
services consumers use. Finally, the federal government’s system for protecting consumers, 
because of the value it places on customization and flexibility, causes consumers of electronic 
payment products to be confused about how they are protected. Payment system stakeholders 
should have an interest in further exploring these issues, since their resolution could increase 
efficiency, lower costs, enhance competition, and open the consumer payment market to more 
desirable products.
  17Appendix A: Protection Summaries 
 
Summary of Credit Card Protections Related to Fraud, Error, and Merchant Dispute 
 
  Federal Law 
(Regulation Z) 
State Law 
(Various State Statutes) 
Association Rules*  General Industry Practice** 
 
FRAUD: Caps liability for fraudulent 
transactions at $50, regardless of 
consumer’s negligence in handling 
card. Liability limits apply regardless 
of when the consumer ultimately 
reports the fraud. Limits liability to 
$0 for mail, phone, and Internet 
charges that are fraudulent. 
Relevant state statutes 
mirror federal law as to 
fraudulent use. 
Zero liability policies require issuers to 
shield consumers from any liability for 
fraudulent use. Policies, however, are 
subject to various association- and bank-
imposed limitations. 
Many issuers will honor the 
associations’ zero liability 
policies for 90 days or more. A 
minority will assess the $50 
permitted by Regulation Z 
after 60 or fewer days. 
ERROR: Requires card issuers to 
investigate and resolve a consumer’s 
claim that a transaction is in error. 
Consumers must notify issuers of the 
suspected error within 60 days of 
receiving the statement on which the 
alleged error appears.  
State statutes generally do 
not address this specific 
situation. 
“Chargeback” policies permit issuers to 
assist consumers who discover erroneous 
transactions for up to 120 days after the date 
of the transaction. 
Issuers will generally leverage 
the “chargeback” procedures 
of the associations and assist 
consumers who discover an 
error for as long as they are 
permitted (i.e., 120 days). 
DISPUTE: Permits consumer to 
assert that a charge for goods that 
were never delivered was an “error,” 




















DISPUTE: Permits consumer to 
assert merchant-related claims against 
the card issuer as long as the 
consumer (i) has not yet paid for 
charge, (ii) made a good faith attempt 
to settle dispute, (iii) lives in same 
state as or within 100 miles of the 
merchant, and (iii) paid more than 
$50 for the item. 
In some states, a creditor 
in a consumer loan 
transaction is subject to 
all of the defenses of the 
borrower arising from the 
consumer sale for which 
the proceeds of the loan 
were used. 
“Chargeback” policies permit issuers to 
return a transaction if a dispute arises up to 
120 days after the date of transaction. While 
ultimately done at the issuer’s discretion, 
dispute-related chargebacks may not be 
subject to the same distance or amount 
limitations as the Regulation Z “claims and 
defenses” protection. 
Most issuers will leverage the 
associations’ chargeback 
procedures to assist a 
consumer who is in a dispute 
with a merchant as long as the 
consumer provides sufficient 
proof of her claim. If the issuer 
cannot charge back the 
transaction, it may call 
merchant directly and attempt 
to settle dispute on behalf of 
the consumer. 
*Please note: These protections are provided by card issuers/networks on a voluntary basis and do not have the force of law. Issuers or networks can generally change them unilaterally 
or decide not to abide by them.  
**Information only intended to give the reader an idea of general industry practice. Consumers should consult their individual bank’s policies for further information. 
  18Summary of Debit Card Protections Related to Fraud, Error, and Merchant Dispute 
 
  Federal Law 
(Regulation E) 
State Law 
(Various State Statutes) 
Association/Network Rules* 
 
General Industry Practice** 
 
FRAUD: Limits liability to $50 if 
consumer reports loss/theft of card 
within 2 days of learning of it and 
$500 if consumer reports after 2 days 
but within 60 days of being sent 
statement reflecting fraudulent 
transaction. Consumer’s own 
negligence is not a factor in assessing 
liability. Limits liability to $0 for 
mail, phone, and Internet charges that 
are fraudulent. 
Beyond modest 
expansions of the time 
permitted to furnish 
notice of a lost or stolen 
card, or a lower 
maximum liability, states 
generally have not 
enhanced the consumer 
protection measures 
contained in Regulation E 
Signature Debit and Interlink: Zero liability 
policies require issuers to shield consumers 
from any liability for fraudulent use. 
Policies, however, are subject to various 
association- and bank-imposed limitations. 
Regional EFT Network PIN Debit: Policies 
require no additional protection. 
Practices vary. The most 
generous issuers provide $0 
liability for 60 days for PIN 
and signature debit. Others 
provide $0 liability for as few 
as 2 days for signature debit 
only. 
ERROR: Permits consumers 60 days 
from statement date during which to 
notify bank about an erroneous 
transaction. 
State statutes generally do 
not address this specific 
issue. 
Signature Debit and Interlink: 
“Chargeback” policies permit issuers to 
return erroneous transactions for up to 120 
days. 
Regional EFT Network PIN Debit: Network 
rules give issuers 120 to 180 days from 
settlement date (depending on the network) 
to return erroneous transactions. 
Most issuers will return an 
erroneous transaction for as 
long as they are permitted 
under applicable network rules
(120 to 180 days). 
FRAUD & ERROR: Requires banks 
to investigate claims in a timely 
manner and provisionally credit if 
investigation exceeds 10 days. 
State statutes generally do 
not address this specific 
issue. 
Signature Debit and Interlink: Requires 
banks to provisionally credit within 5 days. 
Regional EFT Network PIN Debit: Policies 
do not require faster provisional crediting. 
Practices vary. Some issuers 
promise to provisionally credit 
immediately. Most credit 




















DISPUTE: Does not address 
merchant disputes or claims. 
State statutes generally do 
not address this specific 
issue. 
Signature Debit and Interlink: 
“Chargeback” policies permit issuers to 
return a transaction if a dispute arises up to 
120 days after the date of transaction. 
Chargeback is ultimately done at the 
issuer’s discretion. 
Regional EFT Network PIN Debit: 
Policies do not provide dispute protection. 
Most issuers will leverage the 
signature debit and Interlink 
chargeback policies to assist a 
consumer who is in a dispute 
with a merchant as long as the 
consumer provides sufficient 
proof of her claim. 
*
 Please note: These protections are provided by card issuers/networks on a voluntary basis and do not have the force of law. Issuers or networks can generally change them 
unilaterally or decide not to abide by them. 
** Information only intended to give the reader an idea of general industry practice. Consumers should consult their individual bank’s policies for further information. 
  19Summary of ACH E-Check Protections Related to Fraud, Error, and Merchant Dispute 
 
  Federal Law 
(Regulation E) 
State Law 
(Various State Statutes) 
Association/Network Rules* 
(NACHA Rules) 
General Industry Practice** 
FRAUD: Limits liability to $0 if 
consumer reports unauthorized 
use within 60 days of being sent 
statement containing record of 
fraudulent transaction. 
State statutes generally do not 
address this specific issue. 
Limits liability to $0 for 
unauthorized use as long as 
consumer reports within 15 days 
of being transmitted statement. 
Limits liability to $0 for 
unauthorized use as long as 
consumer reports within 60 days of 
transaction settlement date. 
ERROR: Allows consumers 60 
days from statement date during 
which to notify bank about 
erroneous or fraudulent 
transactions. 
State statutes generally do not 
address this specific issue. 
Allows consumers 15 days from 
statement date during which to 
notify bank about erroneous or 
fraudulent transactions and have 
those transactions resolved under 
ACH rules. 
Allows consumers 60 days from 
transaction settlement date during 
which to notify bank about 
erroneous or fraudulent transactions
and have those transactions 
resolved under ACH rules. 
ERROR & FRAUD: Requires 
banks to investigate claims of 
error and fraud and provide 
consumer with response within 45 
days. 
State statutes generally do not 
address this specific issue. 
Does not require bank to 
investigate, but rather relies on 
customer’s sworn statement. 
Most banks do not investigate, but 
instead rely on customer’s sworn 
statement. 
ERROR & FRAUD: Requires 
banks to provisionally credit 
consumer if investigation exceeds 
10 days. 
State statutes generally do not 
address this specific issue. 
Requires bank to “promptly” 
credit as soon as it receives 
customer’s sworn statement. 
Banks will generally credit 
consumer’s account upon receipt of 
sworn statement. 
DISPUTE: Does not provide any 
protection for transactions 
involving a post-purchase dispute 
with merchant. 
State statutes generally do not 
address this specific issue. 
Does not explicitly provide any 
protection for transactions 
involving a post-purchase dispute 
with merchant. 
Effectively extends protection for 
erroneous and fraudulent 
transactions to those involving 




















DISPUTE: Does not provide any 
stop-payment rights. 
State statutes generally do not 
address this specific issue. 
Provides stop-payment rights.  Provides stop-payment rights, but 
limited because of clearing speed. 
*Please note: These protections are provided by card issuers/networks on a voluntary basis and do not have the force of law. Issuers or networks can generally change them unilaterally 
or decide not to abide by them. 
**Information intended only to give the reader an idea of general industry practice. Consumers should consult their individual bank’s policies for further information. 
  20 Summary of Branded Prepaid Card Protections Related to Fraud, Error, and Merchant Dispute 
 
  Federal Law  State Law  Association/Network Rules*  General Industry Practice** 
FRAUD: Federal statutes 
generally do not address this 
specific issue. 
State statutes generally do not 
address this specific issue. 
Zero liability policies require 
issuers to shield consumers from 
any liability for fraudulent use. 
Policies, however, are subject to 
various association- and bank-
imposed limitations (e.g., 
consumers must exercise 
“reasonable care” in handling 
card). 
Varies by issuer. Some issuers 
explicitly limit period after loss or 
theft of card during which they will 
provide zero liability. These issuers 
will not provisionally credit for 10 
days. Others provide zero liability 
for 60 days and provisionally credit 
promptly. 
ERROR: Federal statutes 
generally do not address this 
specific issue. 
State statutes generally do not 
address this specific issue. 
“Chargeback” policies permit 
issuers to assist consumers who 
discover erroneous transactions 
for up to 120 days after the date of 
the transaction. 
Most issuers explicitly provide 
strong error-resolution protection 
for at least 60 days. Many will 
generally leverage the 
“chargeback” procedures of the 
associations and assist consumers 
who discover an error for as long as 


















S  DISPUTE: Federal statutes 
generally do not address this 
specific issue. 
State statutes generally do not 
address this specific issue. 
“Chargeback” policies permit 
issuers to return a transaction if a 
dispute arises up to 120 days after 
the date of transaction. Dispute-
related chargebacks, however, are 
ultimately done at the issuer’s 
discretion. 
Varies by issuer. Some leverage the 
associations’ chargeback 
procedures to assist a consumer 
who is in a dispute with a merchant 
as long as the consumer provides 
sufficient proof of her claim. 
Others require consumers to settle 
disputes themselves. 
*Please note: These protections are provided by card issuers/networks on a voluntary basis and do not have the force of law. Issuers or networks can generally change them unilaterally 
or decide not to abide by them. 
** Information intended only to give the reader an idea of general industry practice. Consumers should consult their individual bank’s policies for further information. 
  21Appendix B: Simplified Illustration of the Typical Credit and Signature Debit Card Transaction* 
 
This is a highly simplified illustration of a typical credit and signature debit card transaction. The dotted arrows represent the authorization process 
(steps 2 through 4), by which the merchant obtains clearance to charge the consumer’s account. The solid arrows represent the clearing and settlement 
process (steps 5 through 7), by which the merchant receives payment from the consumer’s card issuer.  
Merchant’s 
Bank 

















*For more detailed information about credit card transaction processing, see David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying With Plastic (MIT Press, 2
nd ed., 
2005), pp. 9-12. 
  22Appendix C: Estimates of Payment Vehicle Fraud Losses 
 
  Party 
Product  Consumer 
 Brick-and-Mortar 
Merchant  Internet/Catalogue Merchant  Issuer 
Credit Card  NEGLIGIBLE 
In most cases, 
consumer liability for 
fraud limited to $50 
under Regulation Z 









APPROX. $1 BILLION/ 
180 BASIS POINTS OF VOLUME
(1) 
Under association rules, because an 
Internet-based credit card payment cannot 
be authenticated using the card itself, 
Internet merchants are liable for 
transactions that turn out to be fraudulent. 
APPROX. $0.8 BILLION/  
5 BPS OF VOLUME
(2) 
Credit card issuers are generally 





In most cases, 
consumer liability for 
fraud limited to $50 
under Regulation E 









APPROX. $1 BILLION/ 
180 BPS OF VOLUME
(1) 
Under association rules, because an 
Internet-based signature debit card 
payment cannot be authenticated using the 
card itself, Internet merchants are liable for 
transactions that turn out to be fraudulent. 
APPROX. $0.2 BILLION/  
5 BPS OF VOLUME
 (3) 
Signature debit card issuers are 
generally liable for card-present 
fraud under association rules. 
PIN   Debit 
Card 
NEGLIGIBLE 
In most cases, 
consumer liability for 
fraud limited to $50 
under Regulation E 





virtually zero liability 
for PIN debit 
transactions approved 
by the network. 
NEGLIGIBLE 
In general, Internet-based merchants 
cannot accept PIN-debit cards. 
APPROX. $0.1 BILLION /  
<1 BPS OF VOLUME
 (4) 
Under Regulation E, PIN debit 
card issuers are liable for most 
PIN-debit fraud. 
(1) Estimate based on 2005 CyberSource Online Fraud Report. Losses include both chargebacks to merchants because of fraud and credits issued by merchants to 
consumers without return of goods because of fraud. Assumes that half of the fraud on the Internet is perpetrated using credit cards and the other half is perpetrated 
using signature debit cards (see “Debit Volume Exceeds Credit, Visa Says,” Bank Systems & Technology, Aug. 2005, p. 14). Also assumes that total Internet sales 
volume in 2004 was $117 billion (see comScore press release of Jan. 10, 2005). 
(2) Estimate based on data from The Nilson Report (No. 830, Mar. 2005) on general purpose credit card losses for 2004. 
(3) Estimate based on 2004 Deposit Account Fraud Survey by American Bankers Association and 2004 association signature debit volumes from Nilson Report (No. 
830, May 2005) 
(4) Estimate based on 2004 Deposit Account Fraud Survey by American Bankers Association. 
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